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The outcome of the 2019 general election—a resounding Conservative majority and an 
unprecedented defeat for Labour – delivered a decisive electoral verdict for the first time in 
recent years following a period where British politics has been characterised by instability and 
indecision. In this article, we draw on aggregate-level data to conduct an initial exploration of 
the vote. What was the impact of Brexit on the 2019 general election result? How far has Brexit 
reshaped electoral politics? Was 2019 a ‘realignment election’? And, if so, what are the 
implications? With a focus on England and Wales we show that although the Conservatives 
made gains deep into Labour’s working-class heartlands, these gains have been a long time 
coming, reflected in Labour’s weakening relationship with working-class Britain. As such, 
2019 is not a critical election but a continuation of longer-term trends of dealignment and 
realignment in British politics. 
  
 








The 2019 general election marked another watershed moment in a tumultuous period in British 
politics. It was the third general election to be held in four years and the ninth major electoral 
contest in a decade. The election took place against the backdrop of Brexit, the failure of MPs 
to pass a Brexit deal and then Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s inability to secure sufficient 
support for the timetable of his proposed Withdrawal Agreement Bill.1 The 2019 election was 
thus widely seen as the latest episode in Britain’s political drama over Brexit. 
The election produced a large Conservative majority of 80 seats, the party’s largest 
since 1987 and the largest for any party since New Labour’s second victory in 2001 (when 
Labour were still dominant in Scotland). Contrary to arguments that stress the ‘cost of ruling’, 
the Conservatives, who had been in office for almost a decade, attracted nearly 44 per cent of 
the vote, an increase of 1.2 per cent on the previous election in 2017 and their fourth 
consecutive increase since entering power in 2010. Boris Johnson and his party bucked the 
tendency for incumbent parties to lose rather than gain support.  
 For Labour, the election produced a historic defeat. Under the leadership of Jeremy 
Corbyn, the party plunged to 32 per cent of the vote and 203 seats, a loss of 59 seats on 2017 
and its lowest number of seats since 1935. Despite facing an incumbent Conservative Party 
that had presided over austerity, a prolonged economic squeeze and a divisive national debate 
over Brexit, Labour went backwards. The Conservatives, led by an Old Etonian Oxford 
graduate, captured 57 seats, all but three from Labour. These included traditional Labour 
heartlands in the so-called ‘Red Wall’; Great Grimsby (Labour since 1945); Bishop Auckland 
(1935); Bassetlaw (1935); Wakefield (1932); Leigh (1922); Don Valley (1922) and Bolsover 
(a seat Labour had never lost when contesting). 
The election also delivered disappointing results for challenger parties, in the form of 
the Brexit Party and the Liberal Democrats, who had come first and second place at the 
European Parliament elections just seven months earlier. Despite increasing their vote share by 
more than 4 percentage points, the Liberal Democrats only won 11 seats, down 1 from 2017. 
Their leader, Jo Swinson, also lost her seat to the SNP. The Brexit Party polled well in a number 
of target seats - Barnsley, Doncaster and Hartlepool – but ultimately failed to cut through 
amidst the Conservative surge. Meanwhile north of the border, the SNP won 48 of 59 Scottish 
seats, a net gain of 13.  
What explains the outcome of the 2019 general election? In the aftermath of a historic 
defeat, many in Labour, including Corbyn, pointed to Brexit. “Despite our best efforts the 
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election became mainly about Brexit”.2 But was the outcome really shaped only by Brexit? 
And what of the longer term factors that have shaped the geographic sources of support for 
Britain’s main parties? Does Brexit represent a ‘critical turning point’? Or is it part of a longer 
term process of change? 
In this article we answer these questions and build and expand upon our earlier work.3 
We take a step back and explore the long-term factors that shaped the result. In doing so we 
consider the extent to which Brexit has disrupted traditional patterns of electoral support and 
the extent to which 2019 represents a turning point in the evolution of the British party system. 
The idea of turning points – or critical junctures, is related to the notion of ‘realignment’. This 
is an “aggregate-level concept that refers to an abrupt, large, and enduring form of change in 
prevailing electoral patterns, one that is initiated by a critical election and results in a 
significantly different partisan balance in the electorate”.4 In contrast to normal voting eras, 
during ‘critical’ elections citizens reject their habitual voting behaviours and the pendulum of 
party competition swings decisively in a new direction.5 Critical realignments are thus periods 
of dramatic rather than incremental change. The last critical election was arguably 1997, when 
New Labour swept to a landslide victory.6 And to that we can add two other decisive twentieth-
century British watersheds – 1924 and 1945 – which both represented critical turning points in 
the long-term party order.7 Given the way in which Britain’s electoral map was shaken up, can 
we add 2019 to the list of critical elections? Or, alternatively, are we witnessing a more gradual 
realignment, that’s been taking place over a longer period of time? 
We show that although Brexit has reconfigured the geographical base of electoral 
support for the main parties, this process is part of a longer trend that has gathered pace over 
recent years. Brexit may have paved the way for the Conservatives to make gains deep into 
Labour’s working-class heartlands, but these gains have been a long time coming and were 
only made possible by Labour’s weakening relationship with working-class Britain. As such, 
2019 is not a critical election but a continuation of longer-term trends of dealignment and 
realignment in British politics. For much of the past two decades studies have been pointing to 
a tension at the heart of Labour between seeking to expand its support among the liberal, 
metropolitan middle class (whose size as a group in the electorate has been growing over the 
last thirty years) whilst retaining support in its traditional working class heartlands (whose size 
as a group has diminished over time). New Labour and Tony Blair famously sought to appeal 
to the middle class by projecting a more middle class party identity.8 As is well known, the 
party moved to the right on economic issues during this period,9 but this was not the only 
development that weakened electoral support among the working classes. The representation 
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of working class MPs within the party also dramatically declined;10 the career politicians who 
replaced them were much less likely to support policies that helped the working class and those 
at risk of poverty;11 and the party stopped talking about the working class and trying to appeal 
to them as a group.12 As a result Labour alienated working class voters who increasingly 
abstained.13 Although this strategy paid off when working class voters had no one else to turn 
to; it did leave Labour electorally vulnerable to counter-mobilization, as the working class were 
now electorally available and potentially more responsive to other parties. Despite a leftward 
turn under Corbyn, in some respects then the 2019 General Election represents the culmination 
of this process, when the once loyal working class constituencies that had been taken for 
granted by Labour came back to haunt them.  
 
An Overview of the Results  
 
The 2019 general election took place against the backdrop of Britain’s Brexit crisis. Ever since 
the vote for Brexit in 2016, MPs had repeatedly failed to agree on a Brexit deal. Along the way, 
Theresa May had failed in her quest to win a majority in 2017 and then, following the failure 
of Britain to leave the European Union by the original deadline of March 31 2019, a once-
stable two-party system imploded into a four-party race. In the spring of 2019, the Brexit Party 
won the European Parliament elections while the anti-Brexit Liberal Democrats finished in 
second place. Boris Johnson then replaced Theresa May as Conservative leader and Prime 
Minister and, with the eventual support of opposition parties, called the 2019 general election 
after failing to win sufficient support for the proposed timetable of his revised withdrawal 
agreement bill. The election, he hoped, would deliver what MPs had proven unable to deliver: 
Brexit. 
One ‘known unknown’ of the election was whether citizens would head to the polls. 
Would Leavers, frustrated with the parliamentary gridlock on Brexit, turnout in droves to 
endorse Johnson’s central campaign message of ‘Get Brexit Done’? Or would Remainers 
mobilise en masse to endorse one of the pro-Remain parties in order to get a ‘final say’ on 
Brexit? And with an apparent surge in registrations to vote, particularly among those aged 34 
or under, could Corbyn’s Labour enthuse them to participate in the ‘most important election 
for a generation’ and this time record a real ‘youthquake’?  
The overall rate of turnout was 67.3 per cent, 1.5 percentage points lower than in 2017. 
This is the first drop in participation from one election to the next since 2001, when turnout 
fell below 60 per cent. While a cold, dark December day leaves this figure as a respectable one, 
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the 2019 election is also the sixth contest in a row where turnout failed to breach the 70 per 
cent barrier; something that occurred at every election between 1922 and 1997. Only Scotland 
saw participation increase (by 1.6 percentage points), while turnout declined by 1.7 and 2 
percentage points in England and Wales respectively. Northern Ireland recorded a drop of 4.4 
percentage points, leaving turnout at just over 61 per cent.  
Across England there was also a notable North-South divide. In the North East, North 
West and Yorkshire and Humberside, turnout dropped by around 2 percentage points, while 
the West Midlands saw the largest decline as participation fell by, on average, by 2.5 
percentage points. Yet, in the South East the decline was closer to 1 percentage point while in 
the South West turnout was marginally higher overall than in 2017. There was also a 
complicated picture across London. As a region, participation fell, on average, by 2.6 
percentage points but drops of 6 and 7 percentage points in Brent Central, Brent East and Ilford 
South were offset by increases in turnout of more than 4 percentage points seats such as 
Battersea and Putney. Marginality may explain part of the reason for these differences in 
turnout. Given that parties are more rational in their targeting of resources, it is unsurprising 
that there is a significant negative correlation (Pearson R = -0.31*) between change in turnout 
and the marginality of the seat: turnout decreased more in safe seats than in marginal contests.  
The turnout story, however, is more nuanced than this. Turnout, on average, fell more 
in Labour seats (by -2.6 percentage points) than in Conservative-held seats (-0.9 percentage 
points). Brexit makes the picture even more complicated. Turnout in Remain seats fell on 
average, by 0.6 percentage points compared to Leave seats, where it fell by 1.9 percentage 
points. In those Labour held seats that had strongly backed Brexit, turnout declined even more 
sharply, by 3 percentage points. This suggests that Labour may have suffered from a turnout 
problem. Scotland proved to be different than England and Wales. Not only did turnout, on 
average, increase but in SNP-held seats, participation increased by 1.7 percentage points.  
 The 2019 campaign was dominated by the Conservatives. The incumbent party led in 
every single poll during the campaign, a feat that Theresa May in 2017, David Cameron in 
2015 and Cameron again in 2010 had not managed. One has to return to New Labour’s third 
victory in 2005 to find the same degree of poll dominance. Organised around ‘Get Brexit 
Done’, the Conservatives set out to consolidate the Leave vote, neutralise Nigel Farage’s Brexit 
Party and target working-class voters in Labour’s pro-Brexit heartlands. Polling by YouGov 
during the campaign suggested that the Conservatives were successful in achieving these 
objectives, albeit aided by Nigel Farage’s decision at the start of the campaign to stand down 
Brexit Party candidates in the 317 Conservative-held seats. Between the European elections in 
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the spring and the final polls of the 2019 campaign the percentage of Leavers backing the 
Conservatives increased from 36 to 71 per cent; the percentage of 2017 Conservatives returning 
to the fold increased from 58 to 85 per cent; and the percentage of 2017 Conservatives defecting 
to the Brexit Party crashed from 30 to 4 per cent.14  
The Conservative Party strategy, therefore, marked a continuation of the approach that 
had been advocated by Theresa May’s advisor, Nick Timothy. This contended that in the 
shadow of the vote for Brexit Conservatives should downplay David Cameron’s more socially 
liberal brand of conservatism in favour of building a stronger relationship with the more 
socially conservative, working-class areas of the country that had turned out for Brexit three 
years earlier.15 Both Timothy and advisors to Boris Johnson had concluded that ever since 
voting for Brexit Britain was ripe for a realignment. 
 Johnson went further than May, combining strong support for Brexit with socially 
conservative messages on culture and identity and a more assertive response to austerity; 
reforming immigration, adopting a tough approach on crime; increased spending on the NHS 
and infrastructure; increasing the national living wage; addressing regional inequality; and 
providing state-aid for failing UK-based businesses. Such policies were clearly designed to 
appeal to Labour voters whose social conservatism had been loosening their connection to 
Labour for some time.  
In 2017, May had gambled that her path to a majority ran through capturing a large 
number of the nearly 150 Labour seats that had voted for Brexit. But whereas May only won 
six pro-Brexit Labour seats, Johnson carved a much larger slice out of Labour’s territory. Of 
the 54 seats that the Conservatives took from Labour, 50 had voted Leave in 2016 (all except 
Bridgend, Colne Valley, Kensington and Stroud). Of the 50 seats where the Conservative Party 
vote increased the sharpest all but one had voted Leave in 2016. Johnson’s success thus built 
on the geography of the Leave vote. He also built on his party’s result in 2017. Two years ago, 
the Conservatives increased their national vote share by 5.5 percentage points, but in the 
equivalent ‘Red Wall’ Labour seats gained by Johnson in 2019 the Conservatives increased 
their vote, on average, by 10.2 percentage points. Theresa May might have failed to capture a 
large number of Labour Leave seats but she did increase the Conservative vote share in the 
most strongly pro-Brexit Labour seats, to such an extent that Johnson on more modest increases 
in support was able to capitalise.  
Estimates suggest that in 2016 Leave won more than 60 per cent of general election 
seats.16 Its vote was therefore spread far more evenly across England and Wales while the 
Remain vote was more concentrated in cities. Three years later, Boris Johnson succeeded by 
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capitalising on this in-built advantage. Of the 401 seats that were estimated to have voted 
Leave, the Conservatives won 73 per cent of them (292 seats). By contrast, of the 231 seats 
that were estimated to have voted Remain Labour only won 41 per cent of them (95 seats). 
Crucially, the Conservatives also won 32 per cent (73) of Remain seats. All of the 11 seats won 
by the Liberal Democrats had voted Remain.  
Conservative success also built on a strong performance in England where it secured 
nearly 48 per cent of the vote. Given its stronger performance in Labour’s northern Red Wall, 
the Conservatives unsurprisingly recorded their largest vote increases in the East and West 
Midlands, Yorkshire and Humber and the North East of England. More than half of its gains 
(32 seats) were in these regions. However, the Conservatives lost ground in London and barely 
made any advances on their 2017 vote share across southern England. In these places it only 
won 4 seats that it did not win two years previously. It did much better in Wales, increasing its 
vote share by 2.5 percentage points and winning six seats. Only the efficiency of Labour’s vote 
in Wales saved it from further losses to the Conservatives. The only blemish for the 
Conservatives came in Scotland where it lost 3.5 percentage points of its vote and six seats to 
the SNP, though some had predicted a complete wipe out here.  
As in 2017, Labour had entered the 2019 campaign considerably behind in the polls. 
Two years earlier the party’s fortunes and Jeremy Corbyn’s ratings had improved throughout 
the campaign thanks to a well-received manifesto, the ineptness of Theresa May and unpopular 
Conservative Party pledges on social care. History was not about to repeat itself. Dogged by 
party defections, allegations of anti-Semitism and growing concerns on national security 
following the Skripal poisoning in Salisbury, Corbyn came under attack from those within his 
own party as much as his rivals. His leadership ratings were noticeably weaker than they had 
been in 2017; 76 per cent of Britons felt dissatisfied with the way Corbyn was doing his job, 
leaving the Labour leader with the worst ‘net satisfaction’ ratings of any opposition leader since 
Ipsos-MORI began asking the question in 1977.17  
Labour was also divided on Brexit. After a humiliating defeat at elections to the 
European Parliament in May 2019, when Remainers left Labour in droves, leaving it in third 
place with its lowest vote share in the history of this contest, the party came out in support for 
a second referendum on EU membership. With the Liberal Democrats standing on a more 
extreme ‘Revoke Article 50’ position, Labour sought to ‘own’ a more moderate position by 
backing a ‘People’s Vote’, which would include a Remain option for Remainers, and a 
renegotiated Brexit deal with a customs union, which it was hoped would appeal to Leavers. 
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Corbyn himself announced during the campaign that he would take a neutral position in the 
referendum.  
Labour hoped that the compromise position would ‘bring the country together’ but the 
message lacked clarity when compared to Johnson’s ‘Get Brexit Done’ narrative. At the start 
of the campaign YouGov found that 2 in 3 voters thought that Labour’s Brexit policy was 
unclear.18 As a consequence, Labour attempted to make the election about issues other than 
Brexit. Their manifesto ‘It’s time for Real Change’ included radical proposals. Specific policies 
such as raising income tax on high earners, renationalising rail and utilities and reserving one-
third of boardroom places for workers enjoyed strong public support. But Labour was also 
hampered by a public perception that the party lacked credibility and competence: only 16 per 
cent of voters trusted Corbyn most to run the economy (versus 34 per cent for Johnson); 57 per 
cent of voters thought it likely that Britain would enter recession if Labour won the election 
(versus 39 per cent for the Conservatives); and 67 per cent thought that Labour’s spending 
promises would require tax raises (versus 46 per cent for the Conservatives).19 Furthermore, 
Johnson and his party enjoyed ‘issue ownership’ not only on the economy but also Brexit, 
crime and in some polls had closed the historic gap with Labour on the NHS. 
 




In the end, Labour’s support fell back by 8 percentage points in England, 8.5 percentage points 
in Scotland, where the party was reduced to just one seat, and 8 percentage points in Wales, 
where Labour lost six seats in another traditional stronghold. Labour’s vote share plummeted 
by 13 percentage points in the North East, 10 percentage points in Yorkshire and 9 percentage 
points across the Midlands (see Figure 1). The uneasy coalition of its traditional heartlands 
with more remain and liberal seats in the South that Labour had managed to keep together in 
2017 fell apart at the seams. In London and the South of England, Labour fell back by 6 
percentage points. While Labour won marginal Putney, it failed to deliver other targets across 
the capital, like Chipping Barnet, Chingford and Woodford Green, Hendon, while in seats like 
Wimbledon it was replaced as the main challenger to the Conservatives by the Liberal 
Democrats. Despite backing a second referendum, Labour was exposed to the same ‘pincer 
movement’ that it endured in the European Elections less than seven months ago.20  
For the Liberal Democrats there was no repeat of their European election success. 
While the party increased its national vote share by 4.2 percentage points, primarily driven by 
strong performances in London and the South East, four losses (Carshalton and Wallington, 
Eastbourne, East Dunbartonshire and North Norfolk North) were only compensated by three 
gains (Fife North East, Richmond Park and St Albans). The decision by the Brexit Party not to 
stand in Conservative held seats may have hurt the Liberal Democrats in the South East and 
South West of England as it failed to register any gains where it was the main challenger to the 
Conservatives. The Liberal Democrats electoral pact with the Greens and Plaid Cymru to 
‘Unite the Remain’ vote in 60 seats also failed to pay dividends. One of these three parties were 
successful in only 9 of the 60 seats, and this included only one gain (Richmond Park) as the 
other eight were already held. It was also a bad night for rebels; all of the MPs who had defected 
to the Liberal Democrats from Labour, the Conservatives, or short-lived Change UK, lost their 
race.  
 







 The Brexit Party only stood in 275 non-Conservative held seats. Compared to UKIP, 
Farage’s new party saw its vote increase substantially in Yorkshire and Humber and the North 
East where it had a number of target seats. It polled more than 15 per cent in 15 seats and more 
than 20 per cent in four seats. In Wales, it secured more than 5 per cent of the overall vote and 
only polled 9000 fewer votes than the Liberal Democrats. However, like UKIP, the Brexit Party 
struggled in Scotland, winning less than 1 per cent of the overall vote. Scotland remained the 
domain of the SNP. With 45 per cent of the vote, the pro-Remain and pro-Independence SNP 
swept aside Labour in all but one seat and more than halved Conservative Westminster 
representation. Its only loss came in Fife North East where the Liberal Democrats defeated the 
SNP incumbent.  
Figure 2 depicts a correlation matrix for the change in the vote between 2017 and 2019 
for each of the main parties that contested England and Wales. There is a moderate negative 
relationship between the Conservative change in vote and Labour’s change in vote (r =-0.26). 
This implies that the Conservatives gained votes in places where Labour’s vote share declined. 
There was also a moderate, albeit slightly stronger negative relationship between the change in 
vote for the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats (r=-0.55) but a weaker although still 
significant relationship between change in support for the Liberal Democrats and Labour (r=-
0.18). The Liberal Democrats did make a modest resurgence at the expense of Labour (some 
notable outliers include Cities of Westminster; Finchley and Golders Green, Esher and Walton, 
Guilford, Wimbledon etc.) but our evidence suggests that much of the Liberal Democrat gains 
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came at the expense of the Conservatives. By contrast, there is a strong negative relationship 
between the Brexit Party share of the vote and the change in Labour’s vote (r=-0.68. This 
implies that strong performances by the Brexit Party tended to be associated with a decline in 
Labour’s share of the vote. By contrast, the correlation between the Brexit Party and 
Conservative vote is relatively weak but positive (r=0.25).  
 
A Brexit election? 
 
What factors motivated changes in public support for the Conservatives and Labour? To what 
extent, if at all, was this a ‘Brexit election?’ And what types of areas tended to turn towards 
the Conservatives? To see if this election can pass even the most basic test to be considered a 
‘Brexit election’, we begin by looking at how changes in the share of the vote for each of the 
main parties relate to the estimated Leave vote in each constituency in England and Wales 
(Figure 3).21 We focus on England and Wales since the picture in Scotland is somewhat 
different, and is complicated by the cross-cutting issue of Scottish Independence and the 
different party system, where the SNP dominates.22 Though the process that we describe here, 
with Labour losing its traditional seats in the face of a nationalist mobilisation, bears certain 
similarities to what already happened to Scottish Labour in 2014-15 with the rise of the SNP. 
 The core aim of the Conservative Party campaign was to unify the Leave vote, an 
effective strategy given our earlier point that there were far more Leave-leaning seats than 
Remain-leaning ones. As the SNP had shown in Scotland in 2015, uniting one side of a divide 
from a close referendum while the other side is divided can have a disproportionate payoff in 
first-past-the-post elections. Figure 3 shows that the change in the Conservative vote share was 
quite strongly positively related to the estimated Leave vote. Although the Conservatives 
suffered minor setbacks in very pro-Remain seats, they more than compensated for this by 
making greater gains in constituencies that had backed Leave.  
Labour, by contrast, lost votes everywhere. Yet this retreat was particularly evident in 
Leave seats. The Liberal Democrats, in contrast, tended to increase their vote share in Remain 
seats, which further underlines how the Conservative Party strategy of consolidating Leavers 
against a fragmented Remain vote was, ultimately, successful. Labour had sought to stop a 
haemorrhaging of support to pro-Remain parties by shifting behind a second referendum on 
EU membership. The party had also sought to exploit the longstanding structural deficiencies 
of the Liberal Democrat vote. Not only did the Liberal Democrats suffer from an electoral 
credibility problem, but poor performances in prior elections meant that there were few seats 
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where they were the main challenger. Even though many Remain supporters were sceptical 
about the Labour leadership’s support for a second referendum, Labour hoped that many would 
lend their vote to Labour as the best way of stopping Johnson’s Brexit deal. However, the 
electoral geography that had followed the general election of 2017 had actually left few 
opportunities to make further inroads into Remain seats. 
 
 
Figure 3: Change in the Share of the Vote (2017-2019 General Elections) by % Leave 
vote in English and Welsh constituencies 
 
 
Of the 231 seats that had backed in Remain in 2016, only 78 were held by the Conservatives. 
Labour by contrast held 104. Of the 95 seats which recorded an even stronger Remain vote 
(over 60 per cent), only 16 were held by the Conservatives while Labour held 52. But it was 
not only in Remain seats where Labour faced a dilemma. The Liberal Democrat ‘revoke’ 
position was designed to harden its support among Remain voters and as such there was an 
expectation that this would increase the floor of the Liberal Democrat vote across the whole 
country. The knock-on consequences for Labour in their pro-Brexit heartlands were profound. 
If Labour could not unite the ‘Remain vote’ as they had in 2017 then they would need to win 
back Labour ‘Leave’ voters who ever since the referendum had decamped to other parties. 




Figure 4 The Brexit party effect: Change in support for each party in England and 




In Leave seats the picture is complicated by the Brexit Party. Farage had claimed 
throughout the campaign that his party could win in places that the Conservatives simply could 
not reach – though as illustrated above in many cases the Conservative proved to be more than 
capable of capturing Labour heartlands. How then did the presence of the Brexit Party impact 
on the other parties? Figure 4 shows how Labour lost support regardless of whether or not there 
was a Brexit Party candidate. However, the extent to which the change in Labour’s vote share 
was related to the Leave vote share varies. In seats where the Brexit party stood a candidate 
the change in Labour’s vote share was more strongly (and negatively) correlated with the Leave 
vote (r=-0.61); while in places where the Brexit party did not stand the relationship was much 
weaker (r=-0.14). In other words, Labour’s support declined more heavily in pro-Leave seats 
when there was a Brexit party candidate than when there was not.  
It is important to stress that we cannot from these aggregate-level data infer that Labour 
support went directly to the Brexit Party in these areas; these changes may be masking complex 
patterns of movement among individual voters. So, while the Brexit party may have negatively 
affected Labour, it is highly plausible that it may have dampened any large-scale shifts in 
Conservative support in a number of seats. Simply put, without individual level data, such 
relationships are difficult to tease out. 
As shown in Figure 5, these changes have dramatically changed the profile of places 
that the parties now represent. The Conservatives gained votes in places where they have 
historically struggled; seats with large numbers of working-class, where average levels of 
education are low, populations are older and predominantly white. Sequencing is important to 
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making sense of this change. These are the sorts of places that previously backed UKIP and 
which then voted strongly for Brexit. And whereas Conservatives have long prospered in older 
and heavily white seats, their breakthrough in strongly working class and less well educated 
seats is a much more recent and potentially dramatic, development. 
 
Figure 5: Change in Conservative Share of the Vote (2017-2019 General Elections) and 
demographics in English and Welsh constituencies 
 
 
A key feature of Conservative support, therefore, is its changed relationship with class and 
education. Although at the aggregate level these factors are closely related, at the individual 
level class and education are often associated with different value dimensions. Education in 
particular is strongly related to the ‘new’ socially liberal versus social conservatism divide, of 
which the vote for Brexit was also one by-product. In England and Wales, under David 
Cameron the Conservative Party in 2010 and 2015 won more votes where there were more 
graduates. In 2017 this pattern had disappeared but by 2019 it had reversed so that there are 
today fewer Conservative voters in places that have more highly-educated voters. While places 
with more 18-24-year-olds had long recorded lower support for the Conservatives, and while 
this pattern strengthened a little between 2015 and 2017 it was virtually unchanged between 
2017 and 2019. This perhaps reflects the educational changes whereby the party gained older 
non-graduates from Labour but lost older graduates to the Liberal Democrats. While this ‘new’ 
divide is reshaping the Conservative vote, pushing it further away from more educated areas 
and toward communities in which the party has less history and where voters will be more 
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demanding of socially conservative policies, it is even more critical for Labour as it has cut 




How far do these changes in the geography of support signal a break with the recent past? To 
what extent, if at all, does the 2019 general election represent a ‘critical realignment’? 
Figure 6 presents the electoral margin of Labour over the Conservatives for each 
constituency in England and Wales by the percentage of the population employed in working 
class occupations. We derive these data from the census classification of routine and semi 
routine occupations and we explore the data for each election since the Conservatives came to 
power in 2010. One striking feature of the 2019 general election is the collapse in Labour’s 
support in its traditional, working-class heartlands. Although the decline of class voting is a 
well-studied phenomenon, even as recently as 2010 Labour performed substantially better than 
the Conservatives in working class areas. Yet even while the Conservatives have been in 
power, presiding over austerity and an economic squeeze, Labour’s historic in-built advantage 
in their working-class heartlands has been on the wane. 
In 2010, despite losing the election, Labour still enjoyed a healthy lead over the 
Conservatives in seats with a large working-class population. But in each successive election 
this advantage gradually dissolved. In 2019, Labour lost its competitive edge in its blue-collar 
heartlands and its advantage is now not statistically different from zero. This is a watershed 
moment for Labour. It is one thing to lose an election but it is quite another to lose your 
advantage in the very working-class communities which the Labour movement was founded 
to represent. 
 
Figure 6  The difference between Labour and Conservative vote share by class 





Notes: Working class comes from Census 2011 combing Routine and Semi-Routine 
occupations 
  
While Labour’s post-mortem focused on Brexit, the reality is that its collapse was a long-time 
coming. The 2019 election was not a ‘critical election’ as such but rather marked a continuation 
of the long-term trends of dealignment and realignment. This complex interplay between 
turnout and party support is illustrated in Figure 6, which shows the percentage of the electorate 
(eligible voters rather than actual voters) in each seat who voted Labour, Conservative, or 
abstained, by the seat’s class composition. Some key trends stand out. Firstly, in recent years 
abstention has been much higher in working class seats than in more middle class ones. In the 
past, this didn’t necessarily hurt Labour, since the party tended to perform better in working 
class seats – and more importantly, tended to perform better than the Conservatives in places 
where there was a high concentration of people in working class occupations (circa 30%). But, 
remarkably, in 2019 Boris Johnson and the Conservatives outpolled Labour in even those 
places which were very working class.  
 
Figure 7  Support for Labour, Conservative and abstention share by class 





In 2019, abstention increased more in seats where there were larger numbers of 
working-class people. Across England and Wales, the significant negative relationship 
(Pearson R = -0.34*) indicates that voters in more traditional working-class seats were 
particularly less likely to turn out. With Labour disproportionally, relative to its rivals, the 
incumbent in these seats, this provides some circumstantial evidence that Labour failed to 
mobilise its more traditional working-class support. 
The overall level of support for the Conservatives in working class constituencies 
increased somewhat in 2019 compared to 2017 (and their level of support in middle class 
constituencies declined somewhat). Thus, the decline in support for Labour did not map neatly 
on to an increase in support for the Conservatives. Some of Labour’s lost voters probably 
abstained; and others may have switched to the Brexit Party or the Liberal Democrats. But it 
is too simplistic to say that the Conservatives prospered in working class areas because 
traditional Labour voters stayed at home. Even when we consider the electorate as a whole, the 
Conservatives still managed to increase their level of support.  
What role then did Brexit play in this realignment? As has been well documented, the 
vote to Leave tapped into long-standing divisions in Britain that were evident long before the 
referendum took place. However, they have only recently been politically activated. As Figure 
8 shows, the sort of places that ended up backing Leave in great numbers did not vary much in 
terms of their support for Labour or the Conservatives in 2010. However, since the referendum 
the partisan balance between Labour and the Conservatives in England and Wales has 
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intensified around the Brexit dimension. In particular, the Conservatives now do very much 
better than Labour in the sort of seats that voted Leave in 2016. 
 
Figure 8 The difference between Labour and Conservative vote share by support 




Part of this realignment can be traced back to events that took place before the referendum 
occurred. Figure 9 plots the average vote share for each of the main parties in England and 
Wales against the level of support for Brexit in 2016. Even as far back as 2010 we can see the 
genesis of the sort of divisions that would go on to dominate the country as the Liberal 
Democrats and UKIP tapped into the embryonic divides that Brexit would come to crystallise. 
The Liberal Democrats polled very well in the sort of places that would go on to back Remain 
in 2016 while Nigel Farage and the UKIP polled more strongly in the sort of places that would 
go on to back Leave. But then the collapse of these two challengers, first the Liberal Democrats 
between 2010 and 2015, and then UKIP between 2015 and 2017, led to these divides being 
more clearly represented by the two main parties.  
 






What this indicates, then, is that Brexit has accelerated a longer-term realignment in British 
politics and reshaped the country’s political geography. This owes much to how political 
parties have mobilized the issue; with Nigel Farage, UKIP and then later the Brexit Party 
playing an important role in politicising the question of EU membership, and also merging it 
with immigration, and then the Conservatives building directly on this. 
  How much of this is to do specifically with Brexit and how much is to do with the 
underlying value divides that precipitated the vote to Leave in 2016 is an open question. In 
some respects, support for Brexit taps into and is strongly associated with cultural values that 
cut across the traditional left-right divide. And if it wasn’t for this cultural cross-pressure then 
class voting would be stronger. Brexit and the Conservative response to it appear to have 
activated this cultural pressure and so working class communities are more cross-pressured 
than they used to be, which in turn may be partly responsible for what is reshaping class 
alignments. Support for Brexit is strongly correlated with the class composition of a 
constituency (r = 0.78 in England and Wales and r=0.65 across the country as a whole). Class 
realignment and Brexit realignment thus go hand in hand and appear to have implanted a new, 








 Given the strong correlation between class and support for Brexit we have to be careful 
about how we interpret the data. Figure 10 colour codes constituencies according to whether 
they backed Remain (coloured blue, where support for leave <45%); were relatively evenly 
balanced (coloured yellow, where support for leave >= 45% and <=55%) or whether they 
backed Leave (coloured Red, where support for Leave >55%). Over the last few elections we 
can see how the blue ‘Remain’ and mainly middle-class seats have shifted up towards Labour 
(most of them are now above 0 indicating a Labour lead over the Conservatives). Meanwhile, 
the red Leave and predominantly working-class seats have shifted down towards the 
Conservatives (the majority of them are now below 0 indicating a Conservative lead over 
Labour). Britain’s electoral map has thus been fundamentally reshaped. 
 
 
Discussion: A result that was a long time coming? 
 
When seen from a short-term perspective, the outcome of the 2019 general election was a by-
product of the country’s post-2016 divides over Brexit. The contest saw the British people 
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deliver what over the course of the previous three years their elected representatives had proven 
unable to deliver: an answer to Brexit. Boris Johnson’s ‘Get Brexit Done’ campaign ended in 
triumph, leaving him with John Major as only the second leader in British history to lead his 
party to a fourth term in office. Boris Johnson could also claim to be the first Conservative 
leader to triumph over the Europe question, an issue that had undermined Margaret Thatcher, 
John Major, David Cameron and Theresa May.  
 The outcome of the election owed much to Britain’s changing electoral geography, 
electoral rules and party strategy. The Conservatives simply did a far better job than the Labour 
Party at holding together the coalition of voters that they had mobilised in 2017. While public 
support for parties that had backed Remain, and now campaigned for a second referendum, 
was greater than support for parties that had backed Brexit, Boris Johnson benefitted from the 
fact that the Leave vote was not only more consolidated than the Remain vote but was also 
more efficiently distributed across parliamentary constituencies, which translated into a large 
parliamentary majority. The Conservatives were more effective at unifying Leave voters than 
Labour were at unifying Remain voters. This enabled Johnson and his party to make substantial 
inroads into Labour’s traditional working-class heartlands while also fending off the divided 
opposition parties in their southern strongholds, where they were further helped by the absence 
of internecine rivalry from the Brexit Party. 
In the shadow of the result, Boris Johnson visited Tony Blair’s former seat of 
Sedgefield, which for the first time in eighty-four years had elected a Conservative MP. “I can 
imagine people’s pencils hovering over the ballot paper and wavering before coming down for 
us and the Conservatives, and I know that people may have been breaking the voting habits of 
generations to vote for us”. How did the Conservative Party make so much ground in Labour’s 
‘Red Wall’?  
Our analysis suggests that while the Red Wall may have been breached in 2019, the 
foundations had been weakening for some time. The surge of Leave voters may be the final 
element which cracked the brick work, but the decay, reflected in Labour’s weakening 
relationship with working-class Britain, had been setting in over much of the last decade, if not 
earlier. The 2019 general election was not a critical election that signalled a radical departure 
from the past but rather marked the continuation of longer-term trends in the dealignment and 
realignment of political loyalties in British politics.  
While Labour stumbled in its response to these longer-term trends, a reoriented 
Conservative Party has far more effectively outflanked its main competitor on the right, 
consolidated the Leave vote and revised its economic offer to attract voters in left behind 
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communities. But the roots of these changes are long. To truly make sense of the 2019 general 
election we need to take sequencing seriously. A long-time weakening of Labour’s relationship 
with the working-class was first, during the 2000s, reflected in rising rates of apathy among 
working-class voters and also some limited pockets of support for the far-right British National 
Party, which polled most strongly in outer-London but also parts of the Midlands, Yorkshire 
and North West. Nigel Farage and UKIP then further cultivated this soil while also merging 
the issues of EU membership and immigration. By 2014, Farage was drawing much of his 
support from working-class and self-employed voters. Then, in 2016, many of these same 
areas, including 60 per cent of Labour-held seats, voted heavily for Brexit. In 2017, many of 
these same areas then started to break more heavily for the Conservative Party under Theresa 
May, before all of this churn and change in 2019 then allowed Boris Johnson to make major 
gains across Labour's Red Wall.  
Along the way, Labour’s electorate has gradually become less cohesive and structurally 
unsound with socio-demographics such as class, education and ethnicity cross-cutting their 
alliance of voters thereby complicating the party’s appeal and political message.  
Labour is thus left to digest a difficult result. Since 2015, under Jeremy Corbyn, the 
party has experienced its worst ever result in elections to Scottish Parliament, its worst ever 
share of the vote at any European Parliament election, the worst sets of local election results 
for any opposition party in recent times and two consecutive general election defeats. Labour 
has failed to sustain the loyalty of its 2017 electorate, which delivered a surprisingly strong 
result. Its failure to retain this coalition and also navigate the Brexit divides left the party 
exposed on multiple flanks. 
As Britain’s political geography continues to change, it is possible that Labour may 
expand its support among the liberal, metropolitan middle class while the Conservatives pursue 
a more socially conservative and nationalist programme. The problem for Labour, however, is 
that it already holds most of these seats and so increasing its vote share further by squeezing 
the Liberal Democrats or Greens will not be sufficient to win a general election in the 
foreseeable future. While a ‘one-nation’ Conservative Party continues to explore ways of 
cementing its support in the Red Wall, Labour urgently need to find a way to reconnect with 
left behind areas that do not instinctively share the more socially liberal outlook of its activist 
and parliamentary base.  
The Conservative Party faces its own dilemma. In the midst of Conservative euphoria, 
it is important to be cautious about their longer-term prospects. Against the backdrop of the 
vote for Brexit, Boris Johnson has recruited an electorate that is fundamentally different from 
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the electorate that handed David Cameron his majority in 2015; it is older, more working-class, 
more socially conservative, less ethnically diverse and more supportive of redistributive 
measures. Whereas Johnson can claim to have triumphed over the Europe question, the roots 
of future tensions within the Conservative Party -between liberals and conservatives, free 
traders and protectionists- are already visible. While Johnson managed to recruit cross-
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